

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
PRS-01 DOE-11 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 NRC-05 ACDE-00
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P 021659Z FEB 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5450

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 01595

CW MESSAGE NO. 23

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM US UR

SUBJECT: US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS: SEVENTH
ROUND, EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 1978

1. SUMMARY: AT EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING, HELD FEBRUARY 1ST, SOVIET REP MADE EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT CALLING UPON USDEL TO PRESENT SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS ON QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION. IN PREPARED STATEMENT HE REJECTED INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKS, REITERATING PREVIOUS VERIFICATION POSITION AND ALSO U.S. PROPOSAL TO LINK VERIFICATION PROVISIONS TO LEVEL OF TOXICITY. U.S. REP PRESENTED ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF BOTH MEASURES. END SUMMARY.

2. THE EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE SEVENTH ROUND WAS HELD IN THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 1ST AT THE U.S. MISSION.
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3. IN EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT AT THE OPENING OF THE MEETING THE SOVIET REP (AMBASSADOR V. I. LIKHATCHEV) STATED THAT WHILE THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN RECENT PLENARY MEETINGS, THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS FAILED TO PRESENT CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THE QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION. HE CALLED UPON THE U.S. DELEGATION TO

PROPOSE CONCRETE FORMULATIONS DURING PLENARY MEETINGS, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE ISSUE OF IRRITANTS.

4. IN PREPARED STATEMENT LIKHATCHEV SAID THE U.S. APPROACH SEEMED TO BE TO MAXIMIZE VERIFICATION, BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT EVERY STATE PARTY MUST BE CONSIDERED A POTENTIAL VIOLATOR OF THE CONVENTION. HE STRESSED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT WHEN A STATE BECOMES A PARTY IT WILL USE ALL AVAILABLE MEANS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE ON ITS TERRITORY AND THAT THIS CONSTITUTES THE PRINCIPAL GUARANTEE THAT THAT STATE WILL FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS.

5. LIKHATCHEV ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION CONTAINS A COHERENT, BROAD AND REALISTIC SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION. THE SYSTEM IS MADE UP OF NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, SUPPLEMENTED WITH SOME INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ON-SITE FACT-FINDING, ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, IN CASE OF DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE.

6. LIKHATCHEV STATED THAT FOR VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO USE NATIONAL MEANS, "SUPPLEMENTED WITH SOME INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ON-SITE INSPECTION ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS." THE HOST SIDE WOULD DETERMINE FOR ITSELF THE CONDITIONS FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSPECTION.

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TION PERSONNEL. THE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE SUCH THAT THE INSPECTORS CAN FULFILL THEIR FUNCTIONS AND CAN "MAKE A CLEAR JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKS." FUNCTIONS WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THESE TASKS SHOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED.

7. LIKHATCHEV SAID THE U.S PROPOSAL FOR CONTINUOUS INSPECTION BY AN INTERNATIONAL BODY WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES HE HAD OUTLINED AND WAS ALSO UNREALISTIC BECAUSE OF PROBLEM OF INTERFERENCE WITH ACTIVITIES NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT SOME PARTIES MAY DESTROY STOCKS AT FORMER PRODUCTION FACILITIES, RECALLING THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY NOTED THAT THESE FACILITIES ARE IN PRACTICE INTERSPERSED WITH PEACEFUL AND MILITARY INDUSTRY IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT "IT IS PERFECTLY OBVIOUS THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF ANY INTERNATIONAL PERMANENT VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS".

8. LIKHATCHEV SAID THAT A TOXICITY THRESHOLD FOR SEPARATING SUPER-TOXIC AGENTS FROM OTHER AGENTS IS SUPERFLUOUS, WOULD LEAD TO INSURMOUNTABLE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS, AND

COULD CREATE CONDITIONS FOR POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS. HE REJECTED THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO LINK LEVEL OF VERIFICATION TO TOXICITY, STATING THAT FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT THE QUANTITY OF CHEMICAL STOCKS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THEIR TOXICITY. HE STATED THAT "IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT, AS A RULE, THE PROPORTION OF SUPER-TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE TOTAL VOLUME OF STOCKS OF ALL TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS CAN BE ONLY ONE THOUSANDTH, OR EVEN LESS".

9. THE U.S. REP (AMBASSADOR FISHER) RESPONDED TO SOVIET REMARKS ON SUPER-TOXIC AGENTS BY STATING THAT THE DEGREE OF VERIFICATION SHOULD BE A FUNCTION OF THE DANGER TO A COUNTRY'S SECURITY IF THE CONVENTION WERE VIOLATED. HE STATED THAT SUPER-TOXIC CHEMICALS POSED MORE DANGER IN
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THIS REGARD THAN OTHERS AND THAT U.S. PROPOSAL THEREFORE WAS A REALISTIC ONE.

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 01595

10. FISHER REMARKED ON VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF

DECLARED STOCKS, AND POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET STATEMENTS HAD NOT DEALT WITH VERIFICATION OF THE DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES WHICH HAD THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE PROHIBITED CHEMICALS.

11. ANIMATED DISCUSSION ENSUED IN WHICH LIKHATCHEV REITERATED THE POINTS IN HIS STATEMENT AND ASSERTED THAT ANY POINTS WHICH U.S. STILL CONSIDERED UNCLEAR COULD BE CLARIFIED BY STUDYING PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS. FISHER REJECTED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS WOULD INTERFERE WITH SENSITIVE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE. HE SAID A STATE COULD LOCATE ITS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES IN AREAS WHICH DID NOT POSE SUCH PROBLEMS. LIKHATCHEV RESPONDED THAT SUCH STATES AS BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND JAPAN DO NOT HAVE ISOLATED AREAS TO PUT A DESTRUCTION FACILITY.

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12. NEXT (NINTH) PLENARY MEETING WILL BE HELD ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 7. NEXT (SIXTH) DRAFTING GROUP MEETING WILL BE HELD THURSDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 2. SORENSON

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